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ABSTRACT
Blockchain has come a long way — a system that was ini-
tially proposed specifically for cryptocurrencies is now be-
ing adapted and adopted as a general-purpose transactional
system. A blockchain is also a distributed system, and as
such it shares some similarities with distributed database
systems. Existing works that compare blockchains and dis-
tributed database systems focus mainly on high-level prop-
erties, such as security and throughput. They stop short of
showing how the underlying design choices contribute to the
overall differences. Our paper is to fill this important gap.
In this paper, we perform a twin study of blockchains
and distributed database systems as two types of transac-
tional systems. We propose a taxonomy that helps illustrate
their similarities and differences. In particular, we compare
the systems along four dimensions: replication, concurrency,
storage, and sharding. We discuss how the design choices
have been driven by the system’s goals: blockchain’s goal is
security, whereas the distributed database’s goal is perfor-
mance. We then conduct an extensive and in-depth perfor-
mance study on two blockchains, namely Quorum and Hy-
perledger Fabric, and three distributed databases, namely
CockroachDB, TiDB and etcd. We demonstrate how the dif-
ferent design choices in the four dimensions lead to different
performance. In addition, we show that for most workloads,
blockchain’s performance is still lagging far behind that of
a distributed database. However, the gap is not as signif-
icant as previously reported, and under high contention or
constrained workloads, blockchains and databases are even
comparable. Our work provides a framework for exploring
the design space of hybrid database-blockchain systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
The very first blockchain system, that is Bitcoin [47], is
a decentralized ledger for recording cryptocurrency’s trans-
actions. The ledger consists of multiple blocks chained to-
gether with cryptographic hash pointers, each block con-
taining multiple transactions. This chain of blocks is dis-
tributed across a network of nodes some of which behave in
a Byzantine (or malicious) manner [42]. The network runs
a consensus protocol, namely proof-of-work (PoW), to keep
the ledger consistent among the nodes.
Bitcoin is the first digital currency (or cryptocurrency)
system that operates in a Byzantine [42] peer-to-peer (P2P)
environment, without relying on a common trusted third
party. But it can execute only simple transactions that move
some states from one address (or user) to another. However,
recent blockchains such as Ethereum [58] and Hyperledger
Fabric [13] support general-purpose transactions. The key
enabler is the smart contract which is a user-defined compu-
tation executed by all nodes in the blockchain. With smart
contracts, blockchains can execute any transactional work-
load which have so far been handled almost exclusively by
databases. In other words, blockchains have evolved into
transactional management systems, and therefore are com-
parable to distributed databases. Their advantages over the
latter include data transparency and security against Byzan-
tine failures. Many companies and government agencies are
exploring blockchains to replace, or to complement, their
enterprise-grade databases [46, 45, 24].
The parallel between blockchains and distributed data-
bases has not gone unnoticed. Existing works show that
there are little similarities between the two. Blockchains
are suitable when the applications are running in untrusted,
hostile environments, whereas databases are suitable when
performance is more important than security [24, 59, 20,
61]. Their distinction is further compounded by the sig-
nificant gap in performance [29], for instance Bitcoin pro-
cesses around 10 transactions per second [43] while etcd —
a state-of-the-art distributed NoSQL database — processes
over 50, 000 operations per second [31].
One limitation of the existing works that compare block-
chains and databases is that they only focus on application-
level, observable and measurable properties, such as through-
put and security. In particular, they show how the two
types of systems differ without identifying the root cause.
For example, BLOCKBENCH [29] compares three permis-
sioned blockchains, namely Hyperledger Fabric, Ethereum
and Parity, with H-Store under two popular data processing
workloads. It shows a large gap in performance, but pro-
vides no further analysis of the gap. As a consequence, the
reported difference does not generalize to workloads other
than the two used in the experiments. For instance, under
high contention workloads, the performance difference may
shrink drastically, or may even reverse.
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We aim to provide a comprehensive comparison between
blockchains and databases. Our approach is to position
them within the same design space, that is, the design space
of general distributed systems. We propose a taxonomy con-
sisting of four design dimensions and discuss how the two
types of systems make different design choices in each di-
mension. The first dimension is replication, which deter-
mines what data is replicated to what nodes, and the mech-
anism needed to keep the replicas consistent. The second
is concurrency, which determines the performance and cor-
rectness tradeoffs when executing concurrent transactions.
The third is storage, which determines the data models and
access methods. The final dimension is sharding, which de-
termines how data is partitioned, and the mechanism for
atomicity of cross-shard transactions.
Under our taxonomy, existing works such as [29] are in-
complete: they only cover extreme points in the design
space. In contrast, our work is comprehensive, as it presents
and discusses many other points in the space. Our taxonomy
helps illustrate the inherent similarities between blockchains
and databases. Both systems address the same set of prob-
lems in distributed systems, including consistency, failure,
and efficient data access. We observe that different design
choices are made because of the systems’ high-level goals: se-
curity for blockchains and performance for databases. Given
the taxonomy, we conduct experiments to evaluate the ef-
fect of different design choices, thereby giving insights into
the factors that contribute to the overall performance gap.
Another benefit of our taxonomy is that it provides a frame-
work for exploring new designs that merge blockchains with
databases [48, 36, 11].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We compare blockchains and distributed databases as
two different types of distributed, transactional sys-
tems. We propose a new taxonomy that characterizes
the systems along four design dimensions: replication,
concurrency, storage, and sharding.
• We conduct a comprehensive performance study of five
systems under a variety of workloads. The five systems
include two representative permissioned blockchains,
namely Hyperledger Fabric and Quorum, and three
popular database systems, namely CockroachDB, TiDB
and etcd.
• We show that, although blockchains perform poorly
compared to databases in most cases, the former can
still outperform the latter under workloads with high
contention and constraints.
• We show that for blockchains, beside the consensus
protocols, the block validation and commit phase also
have significant impact on the overall performance.
In the next section, we provide an overview of blockchains
and distributed databases. Section 3 presents our qualita-
tive comparison with the focus on the above four dimensions.
Section 4 describes the experimental setup. Section 5 dis-
cusses the performance results. Section 6 reviews related
works before Section 7 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss relevant background on block-
chains and distributed databases. Figure 1 shows a high-
level comparison of these systems.
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Figure 1: Blockchains versus distributed databases
on the security-performance spectrum.
2.1 Blockchain
A blockchain is originally defined as a data structure con-
sisting of a linked list of blocks, where the links are cryp-
tographic hash pointers, and the blocks contain cryptocur-
rency transactions [47]. By this definition, the blockchain is
a tamper-evident ledger for recording transactions. In this
paper, we use a more recent and popular definition of block-
chain, which is a distributed system consisting of multiple
nodes some of which are Byzantine. The chain of blocks, or
the ledger, is kept consistent at all nodes via a Byzantine
fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol.
In the earlier designs, a blockchain transaction is restricted
to cryptocurrency and the states are modeled as Unspent
Transaction Outputs (UTXO). For example, Bitcoin [47]
and other similar altcoins use the UTXO model. Start-
ing with Ethereum [4], blockchains support smart contracts
which allow users to encode and execute arbitrary Turing-
complete computations on the ledger. The ledger states are
modelled as accounts instead of UTXO. Other systems sup-
porting smart contracts include Quorum, Parity and Hy-
perledger Fabric [13]. In these systems, a transaction on
the ledger takes the form of a contract invocation, which
modifies the ledger in a pre-agreed way determined by the
consensus protocol. A read-only transaction can be carried
out by any node, without undergoing the consensus and be-
ing included in the ledger. We only consider blockchains
that support smart contracts in this paper, because earlier
blockchains (without smart contracts) cannot support data-
base transaction workloads, thus, cannot be compared to
distributed databases.
Permissionless vs Permissioned Blockchains can be
broadly divided into two categories: permissionless (or pub-
lic), and permissioned (or private). In the former, for ex-
ample in Bitcoin and Ethereum, any node and user can join
the system in a pseudonymous manner. In the latter, for
example in Fabric and Quorum, the node and user must
be authorized to join the system. With strong member-
ship control and action regulation, permissioned blockchains
are more suitable for enterprise applications and are par-
ticularly used in the financial sector. Figure 1 shows the
security-performance tradeoffs in blockchains. It highlights
how permissionless blockchains can achieve stronger secu-
rity because they make no identity assumption. In contrast,
permissioned blockchains have weaker security because of
the identity assumption, but can achieve higher performance
because they can employ consensus protocols with higher ef-
ficiency. A more detailed discussion of permissionless versus
permissioned blockchain designs can be found in [28, 29].
2.2 Distributed Databases
Unlike blockchains, database systems have been around
for decades. Relational databases, which support easy-to-
use SQL language and intuitive ACID transaction semantics,
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Figure 2: (a) Blockchains first reach consensus on the ledger (transaction history) and then serially commit
their effects into the storage; (b) Distributed databases replicate at the storage layer, which is below the
transaction layer.
remained mainstream throughput the years. The recent de-
mand of big data processing and the fact that Moore’s law is
reaching its limit are major factors behind the trend of scale-
out database designs. Nowadays, both data and computa-
tion are distributed over multiple nodes in order to achieve
high availability and scalability. Principles and techniques
in designing and scaling distributed databases are described
in detail in [50]. Basically, there are two distinctive move-
ments, namely NoSQL and NewSQL, under this new design
direction.
NoSQL vs NewSQL. For scalability, many distributed
databases abandon the complex relational model and the
strong ACID semantics. These systems are referred to as
NoSQL. They support more flexible data models and weaker
consistency. They adopt the BASE principle for their trans-
action semantics. In the sense of CAP [33] theorem, these
NoSQL systems compromise consistency for the sake of avail-
ability. A variety of their supported data models may in-
clude key-value store (e.g, Redis [18], etcd [3]), document
store (e.g, CouchDB [12]), graph store (e.g, Neo4J [56]),
column-oriented (e.g, Cassandra [39]) and so on. The most
lenient consistency model is eventual consistency which makes
no guarantees about the order of read and write operations.
In the middle of the eventual and strong consistency, re-
searchers explore a variety of other abstractions, such as
sequential, causal and PRAM consistency. They standard-
ize on the allowable operation behavior for the ease of rea-
soning. Most NoSQL stores offer them as the configurable
options, where users can tradeoff between performance and
consistency.
The surge of NoSQL systems, however, does not obscure
the cost in usability and the increase in application com-
plexity. A new class of distributed database systems, called
NewSQL, emerge which aim to restore the relational model
and ACID semantics without sacrificing much scalability.
NewSQL has drawn attention since Google introduced Span-
ner [23], the first NewSQL system. It was followed by a few
database vendors, such as CockroachDB [2] and TiDB [8].
In this paper, we consider both NoSQL and NewSQL sys-
tems.
3. TAXONOMY
In this section, we present a distributed system taxon-
omy that illustrates the important design choices made by
blockchains and distributed databases. We highlight how
the differences are driven by the fact that these systems aim
to achieve different goals: security for blockchains, and per-
formance for databases.
3.1 Replication
Replication is the technique of storing copies of the data
on multiple nodes called replicas. The key challenge in such
a system is to ensure consistency, which involves running a
consensus protocol among the replicas. Through this con-
sensus protocol, the replicas reach agreement on the latest
data. In this section, we characterize blockchains and dis-
tributed databases by the replication model, failure model,
and consensus protocol.
3.1.1 Replication model
Blockchains replicate transactions, whereas databases repli-
cate storage operations (reads and writes). As depicted in
Figure 2, a blockchain replicates the ordered log of transac-
tions by running a consensus protocol. Each node then ex-
ecutes the transactions against its local states (the ledger).
On the other hand, a distributed database replicates the or-
dered log of read and write operations on top of the storage.
The nodes in the database are oblivious to the transaction
logic because they see only one operation at a time. In other
words, the transaction manager which coordinates the ex-
ecution of a transaction must be trusted — a common as-
sumption in databases. The blockchain, which assumes ma-
licious nodes, does not have that trusted entity, therefore it
must replicate the entire transaction.
3.1.2 Failure model
Fault tolerance is an important goal of any distributed sys-
tem. Distributed databases assume crash failure, in which
nodes only fail by crashing. In this model, referred to as
crash fault tolerance (CFT), the system needs to tolerate
hardware and software crash, as well as network partition.
CFT is suitable for databases, because they are consid-
ered internal systems, protected by many layers of secu-
rity. Blockchains, on the other hand, assume hostile en-
vironments, in which a node can behave arbitrarily. In this
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) model, the system needs to
tolerate any software and hardware failures, as well as any
malicious user. This model is appropriate when the system
3
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while the later becomes unavailable but in consis-
tency.
needs to operate correctly under security attacks. For ex-
ample, the nodes may be compromised by an attacker and
therefore deviate arbitrarily from the protocol.
CFT protocols have lower security guarantees than BFT,
but they can achieve higher performance for a given num-
ber of failures. In particular, to tolerate f failures, CFT
requires 2f+1 replicas, whereas BFT requires 3f+1. We ob-
serve that some permissioned blockchains support both fail-
ure models. For example, Quorum provides both Raft [49], a
CFT protocol, and Istanbul consensus, a BFT protocol, im-
plementation. These systems allow application developers to
make different tradeoffs between security and performance.
3.1.3 Consensus protocol
Permissionless blockchains adopt proof-of-work (PoW) or
other variants such as proof-of-stake (PoS) and proof-of-
elapsed time (PoE). In contrast, both permissioned block-
chains and distributed databases adopt classic CFT or BFT
protocols, such as Paxos [41, 40], Raft [49], and PBFT [19].
Detailed comparisons between PoW and other consensus
protocols can be found in [28, 17]. Here, we discuss the
reason and implication of adopting PoW for permissionless
blockchains. Our discussion also extends to other PoW vari-
ants.
In the permissionless setting, a node or user can have
many identities. The lack of strong identity renders voting-
based protocols — most classic CFT and BFT protocols
in the literature are voting-based — infeasible. PoW over-
comes the identity problem by relying on incentives. In
PoW, a node’s probability of solving a computational puzzle,
thereby solving consensus and gaining rewards, is propor-
tional to its physical resources which are difficult to forge.
Thus, the node has no advantage in having multiple identi-
ties.
In an asynchronous network, FLP theorem [32] rules out
any deterministic consensus protocol that can achieve both
safety and liveness. Permissionless blockchains assume that
nodes communicate over the Internet which is subject to
unpredictable performance and frequent partitioning. They
opt for liveness over safety, which means the system contin-
ues to work under network partitions, but these partitions
may be in disagreement in the form of chain forks, as shown
in Figure 3. For safety, permissionless blockchains rely on
the network synchrony. In particular, when the partition
time is longer than the block interval, nodes in each net-
work partition independently append to the ledger. But
when the network partition heals, transactions in shorter
forks are discarded. This is the reason why permissionless
blockchains require users to wait for transactions committed
several blocks behind, before considering them in effect. We
note that choosing liveness over safety is inevitable in the
Internet environment because otherwise, the system will be
unavailable for most of the time.
PoW protocols are less sensitive to network conditions
than classic CFT and BFT protocols because the latter are
communication bound. In particular, most CFT and BFT
incur O(N2) message complexity, where N is the network
size. The delay of a single message may trigger the expen-
sive recovery mode, which may worsen the delay and lead
to performance collapse [29]. PoW protocols, on the other
hand, are computation bound, in which the difficulty of the
computational puzzle is adjusted gradually to approximate
a fixed block interval. By not relying heavily on network
communication, PoW blockchains achieve higher availability
than permissioned blockchains and distributed databases.
3.2 Concurrency
Most blockchains execute transactions sequentially, while
distributed databases employ sophisticated concurrency con-
trol mechanisms to extract as much concurrency from the
execution as possible. The reason for blockchains’ choice
of serial execution is two-fold. First, serial execution may
not affect the overall performance because execution is often
not the bottleneck. For example, in Bitcoin, the consensus
protocol may take several minutes, while transaction exe-
cution takes only a few seconds. Second, enforcing serial
execution means the behavior of smart contracts is deter-
ministic when the transaction execution is replicated over
many nodes. The benefit of determinism is that it is easy
to reason about the states of the ledger, which makes the
consistency model simple.
Unlike blockchains, concurrency remains a major research
topic in databases. To exploit more concurrency inherent in
the workloads, complex mechanisms are being proposed to
ensure some forms of correctness. In particular, there exists
a wide range of isolation levels [21, 15] which make differ-
ent tradeoffs between correctness and performance. Most
production-grade databases today offer more than one iso-
lation level.
We note that some blockchains start to employ simple
concurrency techniques used in databases. In Hyperledger
Fabric, for example, transactions are simulated in parallel
against the ledger states before sent for ordering. The sys-
tem uses a simple optimistic concurrency control to achieve
serializability which aborts transactions whose simulated states
are stale. More established techniques to reduce abortion
have also been proposed [54].
3.3 Storage
In this section, we describe how blockchains and distributed
databases build different models and data structures on the
underlying storage.
3.3.1 Storage model
The storage in blockchains exposes an append-only ledger
abstraction. The ledger records historical transactions and
the changes made to the global states. Some systems allow
applications to access only the latest states, for example,
Hyperledger Fabric v0.6. Novel storage systems have been
proposed to enable access to any historical states during
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smart contract execution [51]. The storage in distributed
databases, on the other hand, exposes direct access to data
records. In databases without explicit provenance support,
historical data is maintained in limited forms, for example as
write-ahead logs. We note that such logs are used primarily
for failure recovery, and they are periodically pruned.
3.3.2 Index
One of the most important properties of blockchains is
data integrity, which means any tampering with the data
on the ledger must be detected. As a result, blockchains use
Merkle tree index structures to provide both efficient data
access and integrity protection. For example, Ethereum uses
a prefix trie, named Merkle Patricia Trie (MPT) [5]. In the
MPT, the states are stored at the leaves, and the ones with
a common key prefix are organized into the same branch.
Each node is associated with the cryptographic hash of its
content, such that the root hash represents the complete
global states. The access path serves as the integrity proof
for the retrieved value. Older versions of Hyperledger Fabric
use a Merkle Bucket Tree (MBT) in which the size of the
tree is fixed.
Indexes play such an instrumental role in databases that
any small optimization on the index can translate to signif-
icant improvement in performance. Modern indexes are de-
signed to be hardware-conscious in order to extract the most
efficiency from the hardware. For example, in-memory data-
bases abandon the disk-friendly B-tree structure for other
structures such as FAST [37] and PSL [60] which are de-
signed for better cache utilization and multi-core parallelism.
3.4 Sharding
Sharding is a common technique in distributed databases
for achieving scalability, in which data is partitioned into
multiple shards. Although it has been studied extensively
in databases, sharding has only recently been introduced to
blockchains. In this section, we discuss two key challenges in
any sharded systems, that are (i) how to form a shard, and
(ii) how to ensure atomicity for cross-shard transactions.
3.4.1 Shard formation
A shard formation protocol determines which nodes and
data go to which shard. The security of blockchains de-
pends on the assumption that the number of failures is
below a certain threshold. The shard formation protocol
must, therefore, ensure that the assumption holds for every
shard. In particular, the shard size must be large enough
so that the fraction of Byzantine nodes is small. Further-
more, the attacker must not be able to influence the shard
assignment, otherwise, it could put enough resources into
one shard to break the security assumption. State-of-the-art
sharded blockchains have different approaches. For example,
Elastico uses PoW for shard formation [44], Omniledger [38]
employs a complex cryptographic protocol, while AHL [25]
uses trusted hardware. The last two systems perform regular
shard reconfiguration, by re-executing the shard formation
protocol, in order to guard against adaptive adversaries.
The goal of sharding in distributed databases is scalabil-
ity. As such, the systems aim to assign data to shards in a
way that optimizes the performance of certain workloads. In
practice, they offer a variety of partitioning schemes, for ex-
ample, random partition and range partition, so that users
can select the most suitable for their workloads. Some sys-
tems, for instance, Cassandra[39], even allow users to specify
workload distributions so that data can be partitioned in a
locality-aware manner. Unlike blockchains, shard reconfigu-
ration is not necessary for databases, unless when there are
significant changes in the workload distribution.
3.4.2 Atomicity
Sharding introduces the problem of transaction atomic-
ity when a transaction can touch data at multiple shards.
Atomicity requires the cross-shard transaction to either com-
mit at all shards or not at all. In databases, this problem
is addressed by the two-phase commit (2PC) protocol. This
protocol requires a dedicated transaction coordinator. This
coordinator is trusted, but it may fail and leave the trans-
action blocked forever. Three-phase commit protocol (3PC)
eliminates the blocking problem, but it relies on strong as-
sumptions of the network.
Sharded blockchains face additional challenges in ensur-
ing atomicity because under the Byzantine failure model the
coordinator cannot be trusted. To overcome this, both [25,
36] propose to implement a 2PC state machine in the shard
that runs a BFT protocol. The BFT protocol ensures that
the shard is less vulnerable to attacks and does not become
a point of failure. Any cross-shard transaction must involve
this 2PC BFT replicated state machine to ensure atomic-
ity. The consensus liveness guarantees the service high avail-
ability, therefore mitigating the blocking problem. But the
Byzantine setup in blockchains imposes considerable over-
head to the 2PC process.
3.5 Discussion
We have so far discussed the similarities and differences in
the design of blockchains and distributed databases. Here,
we describe an important, implementation-specific differ-
ence between the two.
Both systems require users to authenticate their requests.
Databases support user sessions, meaning that the user only
needs to authenticate once per session which usually consists
of multiple requests. Blockchains, on the other hand, do not
support user sessions, and the user has to sign every request.
We show in Section 5.2.2 how this affects performance of
read-only transactions. We note that adding support for
user sessions in blockchains is possible, but would incur sig-
nificant storage and computation overhead because session
information must be maintained by the smart contracts.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The previous section presented a qualitative comparison
of blockchains and distributed databases. We now demon-
strate how the design choices affect system performance by
conducting a comprehensive performance evaluation of five
different systems. In this section, we describe the setup of
our experiments.
4.1 Systems
We select five representative systems: two permissioned
blockchains, namely Quorum and Hyperledger Fabric, and
three distributed databases, namely CockroachDB, TiDB
and Etcd. Together, they cover a large area of the design
space laid out in Section 3.
Quorum [7] (version 1.8.12) is a permissioned blockchain
based on Ethereum. It targets the financial sector which
5
Node
Node
Txn 
Proposal
Block 
Proposal
Node
Node
Consensus
Ledger: Block 
Validation
(a) Quorum transaction lifecycle
Ledger Node
Node
Block 
Validation
Ordering 
Service
Node
Node
Txn Proposal
Simulation Result
Txn Proposal 
with Result
(b) Fabric transaction lifecycle
Figure 4: Transaction execution in Quorum versus
Hyperledger Fabric. In Quorum, a node assembles
pre-executed transactions into blocks and send them
through consensus. In Fabric, a client collects simu-
lation results and endorsements from peer nodes to
form a transaction. Orderer nodes order the trans-
actions and batch them into blocks, which are then
pulled by the peer nodes for independent validation
and commit.
requires greater efficiency and data privacy than what is
provided by Ethereum. Quorum replaces Ethereum’s Proof
of Work (PoW) with a CFT protocol, namely Raft, and a
BFT protocol called Istanbul BFT. However, its execution
model is similar to Ethereum’s. First, a leader executes
transactions speculatively and assembles a new block. Next,
the leader starts the consensus protocol so that the other
nodes agree on the block. Finally, all the nodes execute the
block.
Hyperledger Fabric [13] (version 1.3) is a popular per-
missioned blockchain started by IBM and the Linux Founda-
tion. It has a modular design and features a novel execute-
order-validate execution model. The system has two types
of nodes: peers which execute smart contracts and validate
blocks, and orderers which order transactions. A transac-
tion is executed in three phases. In the Proposal phase, a
client requests the peers to execute the transaction specu-
latively. The client collects the results and signatures from
the peers and sends them to the orderers, triggering the
next phase. In the Order phase, orderers order the trans-
actions and batch them into blocks. In the Commit phase,
each peer pulls blocks from the orderers and independently
validates each block before persisting the results. The block
validation process involves verifying signatures and checking
for conflicts in the read/write sets. Read-only transactions
use only the Proposal phase. Figure 4 compares Fabric’s
execution with Quorum’s.
CockroachDB [2] (version 2.1.1) is a distributed NewSQL
relational database that supports both ACID transactions
and horizontal scalability. It relies on the Raft consensus
protocol to synchronize replicas. As an open-source solu-
tion inspired by Spanner [23], CockroachDB utilizes a syn-
chronized clock to coordinate two-phase commit (2PC) for
transaction atomicity and serializability.
TiDB [8] (version 2.1.0) is another distributed NewSQL
database system that supports both SQL semantics and hor-
izontal scalability. While CockroachDB takes a monolithic
approach, TiDB is featured for its modular design. TiDB
consists of three independent components, namely Place-
Table 1: Experiment variables.
Variable Value
Record size (Byte) 10, 100, 1000, 5000
Zipfian coefficient θ 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0
# of transaction operations 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10
# of node 3, 5, 7, 11, 15, 19
ment Driver for coordinating cluster management, TiKV
servicing as the replicated key-value storage, and TiDB-
server for parsing and scheduling SQL queries in a stateless
manner. TiDB also employs optimistic concurrency control
and 2PC for transaction management, as well as Raft for
replica consistency. However, its data isolation level only
support snapshot isolation, more lenient than serializable in
CockroachDB.
Etcd [3] (version 3.3.13) is a NoSQL database used in
many large-scale systems [6]. Etcd provides a simpler key-
value data model with relaxed transactional restriction but
focuses on the tradeoff between availability and consistency.
Similar to blockchains, etcd employs a single consensus in-
stance to sequence all the requests. Without sharding, data
are fully replicated on each node.
4.2 Setup
For a fair comparison, we run the five systems in full repli-
cation mode in which each node has a complete copy of the
states. In particular, for Fabric we use the endorsement pol-
icy under which a transaction is executed and endorsed by
all peers. For CockroachDB and TiDB, we set the replica-
tion factor to be the same as the number of nodes.
We use CFT protocols in all five systems. In particular,
we configure Quorum to use Raft, and Fabric to use Kafka
which is a CFT protocol. We also disable all optional secu-
rity features, such as data encryption and Transport Layer
Security (TLS) communication.
We set the number of transactions per block to 100 in
Fabric and the block interval to the minimum in Quorum.
We scale all TiDB’s modules with the number of nodes so
that each node runs all three modules in different processes.
For Fabric, we run the orderers on two nodes and Kafka on
three nodes.
Unless otherwise specified, we use the YCSB and Small-
bank workloads in our experiments. The experiment param-
eters for YCSB are summarized in Table 1 with the default
values underlined. Our experiments are conducted on an
in-house cluster consisting of 96 nodes connected via 1Gb
Ethernet. Each node is equipped with Intel Xeon E5-1650
3.5GHz CPU, 32GB RAM and 2TB hard disk. All the ex-
periments are repeated three times and we report the aver-
age results.
4.3 Benchmark Driver
We note that existing benchmark drivers for databases
are synchronous (or closed-loop), meaning that a next re-
quest is sent only when the current request is completed.
In contrast, blockchain benchmark drivers, such as Fabric’s
Caliper and BLOCKBENCH driver [29], are asynchronous
(or open-loop) in which a new request is sent as soon as the
current request is acknowledged by a node in the blockchain.
Figure 5 illustrates the difference between the two types of
drivers. In a synchronous driver, a separate status thread
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Figure 5: Differences between synchronous and
asynchronous drivers. Asynchronous drivers can is-
sue more transactions, as they do not have to wait
for their completion, as opposed to the synchronous
ones.
is responsible for computing statistics. In an asynchronous
driver, the status thread needs to keep track of outstanding
requests and to periodically poll the blockchain for newly
completed requests.
Asynchronous drivers are suitable for blockchains because
of the long request latency which requires a large number of
outstanding requests to saturate the system. In other words,
benchmarking a blockchain with synchronous drivers would
require many nodes to run the driver. To illustrate this, we
implement a synchronous YCSB driver for Fabric using its
Java SDK. Figure 6 compares the peak throughput using
this driver with that obtained using Caliper. We observe
that the synchronous driver severely underestimates Fabric’s
performance, even with a large number of connections.
For the database experiments we use the open-source driver
for YCSB workload [9] and the OLTPBench [27] driver for
Smallbank workload. Both Fabric and Quorum are bench-
marked using Caliper [1]. We emphasize that although there
are differences in the types of drivers for benchmarking block-
chains and databases, they alone do not account for the large
performance gap reported in the following section.
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present our comprehensive, quantita-
tive comparison between blockchains and distributed data-
bases. We start by comparing the systems’ peak perfor-
mance under the default configurations. We then analyze
how the design choices discussed in Section 3 affect the over-
all performance.
5.1 Peak Performance
5.1.1 YCSB
We first analyze the peak performance of the five systems
under the default configurations (Table 1). Specifically, we
populated each system with 100K records, each of size 1
KB. We then measured the throughput and latency against
three YCSB workloads: uniform update-only (100% writes),
uniform query-only (100% reads), and uniform mixed (50%
reads and 50% writes) workload. We also measure indepen-
dently the performance of TiKV, the replicated storage of
TiDB, and include it in this comparison.
Figure 7 shows the peak throughput of the six systems
against the three workloads. It can be seen that relational
(NewSQL) databases outperform blockchains, and replicated
16x4 16x80
200
400
600
tp
s
Throughput
YCSB (Sync) Caliper (Async)
Figure 6: Fabric peak throughput measured from
YCSB (synchronous) and Caliper (asynchronous)
drivers. 16x4 (, 16x8) implies a total of 16 client
nodes, each of which establishes 4 (, 8) connections.
storages (NoSQL) outperform relational databases. Specif-
ically, the two blockchains achieve throughputs below 500
transactions per second (tps), whereas the two relational
databases, namely CockroachDB and TiDB, achieve 2443
tps and 3650 tps, respectively. The two key-value storages
achieve over 10, 000 tps. We note that the blockchains have
weaker guarantees for read-only transactions compared to
those offered by the databases (linearizability). Despite this
fact, they still have the worst performance. For example,
Quorum’s throughput is 10× lower than etcd’s. Under the
mixed workload, the peak throughputs of all systems in-
crease, which indicates that the overhead of read requests
is much lower than that of write requests. The two NoSQL
systems outperform the two NewSQL systems because the
former do not incur the overhead of supporting ACID trans-
actions. The gap between TiDB and TiKV is also caused
by the overhead of the TiDB-server that wraps around the
key-value storage.
Our results further confirm the conclusion drawn in [29]
that the performance of blockchains lags far behind state-of-
the-art databases. However, we observe a smaller gap than
reported in [29]. The key reason is that the previous work
used H-Store, an in-memory, distributed database with no
consensus-based replication. H-Store represents an extreme
point in our design space that makes it rather dissimilar to
blockchains. In contrast, all five systems considered in our
work incur some overheads from the consensus protocols.
Figure 8a and 8b show the latency when the systems are
unsaturated. Similar to throughput, we observe a clear gap
between the blockchains and the databases. Responses to
read requests in the former take longer (up to 6× in Fabric)
than the linearizable reads in the latter. The write latency
in Fabric and Quorum is 1000ms and 500ms respectively,
while in databases it is below 100ms. One exception is TiDB
which takes 189ms. This is due to the modular architecture
of TiDB which introduces overheads in the form of commu-
nication among different modules.
5.1.2 Smallbank
Figure 9 compares the systems’ OLTP performance un-
der the Smallbank workload. We do not include etcd be-
cause it does not support general transactional workloads.
Compared to YCSB, a Smallbank transaction touches more
records and imposes more constraints, for example, sufficient
funds must be available for the payment transactions to suc-
ceed. However, the record size is smaller. Our experiments
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Figure 9: Performance under Smallbank.
show that TiDB has the highest performance, with a peak
throughput of 7391 tps, because of the weak isolation level.
Among the other systems, all of which provide serializability,
we find that CockroachDB is comparable to the two block-
chains. More specifically, CockroachDB achieves 683 tps,
while the two blockchains achieve 405 and 675 tps, respec-
tively. The results indicate that the transaction constraints
in Smallbank limit the level of concurrency extractable un-
der serializability guarantee.
Notably, while the performance of CockroachDB drops
when switching from YCSB to Smallbank, we observe that
the performance of Quorum improves. Its peak throughput
reaches 675 tps with Smallbank, 2× greater compared to
YCSB, as shown in Figure 7a. We attribute this improve-
ment to Smallbank’s smaller record size. As we shall see
in Section 5.3.3, Quorum’s performance is extremely vul-
nerable to larger transactions. Fabric delivers the lowest
performance in terms of both throughput and latency.
5.2 Replication
5.2.1 Effect of number of nodes
Table 2: Throughput with varying number of nodes
under full replication mode.
3 7 11 15 19
Fabric 389 394 345 344 333
Quorum 237 236 229 217 219
CockroachDB 3060 2411 2482 2464 2282
TiDB 4150 6037 5793 5872 4535
Etcd 16492 16849 9123 7801 6076
We analyze the impact of the number of nodes on the over-
all performance by running experiments with an increasing
number of nodes. Recall that all five systems are in full
replication mode, i.e., the number of replicas is the same as
the number of nodes. Table 2 lists the peak throughputs
under the uniform update workload.
Fabric’s throughput drops slightly from 389 tps on 3 nodes
to 333 tps on 19 nodes. By analyzing the timing logs, we
find that there is a 15% increase in the block validation la-
tency from 222ms on 3 nodes to 249ms on 19 nodes. This is
expected because the endorsement policy requires a transac-
tion to be endorsed by all peer nodes, hence more nodes lead
to larger transactions and therefore longer validation. Since
a block is validated sequentially, the increase in validation
time translates to the decrease in throughput.
Quorum exhibits a relatively constant performance, which
is unexpected because the Raft protocol does not scale well
with the number of nodes. We find that the current imple-
mentation of Quorum underutilizes Raft. Specifically, the
system does not pipeline consensus requests; instead, it only
starts a new consensus round whenever the previous one fin-
ishes. Without pipelining, the throughput is only the inverse
of the latency. In our experiments, the consensus latency in
Quorum is relatively constant as the number of nodes in-
creases, resulting in the overall throughput unchanged.
All databases show performance degradation when there
are more nodes. In particular, CockroachDB peaks at 3
nodes, TiDB at 7 nodes and etcd at 7 nodes. This is as
expected because the full replication mode incurs communi-
cation overheads that grow exponentially with the increment
of nodes.
5.2.2 Effect of replication model
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To understand the impact of the replication model, we fo-
cus on Fabric and TiDB which support different transaction
lifecycles. We instrumented the codebase to record detailed
latency breakdown at every phase of the execution. In par-
ticular, for Fabric, we measured the latency of the proposal,
consensus, and validation (or commit) phase. For TiDB, we
recorded the latency of the SQL parsing, SQL compilation,
and commit phase. Figure 10a and 10b show the detailed
latency for the two systems under the uniform update work-
load.
Before Fabric is saturated (on the left side of the dashed
line in Figure 10a), the consensus and validation phase take
roughly the same time, while the proposal phase is almost
negligible. Interestingly, the consensus latency decreases
when the request rate increases. This is because the or-
derers wait for enough transactions (100 in our case) before
creating a block. This wait time is lower when transactions
are submitted more frequently. However, when the request
rate exceeds the system capacity, the validation phase be-
comes the bottleneck, as shown by the significant increase in
its latency. On the other hand, the latency of a TiDB trans-
action is dominated by the commit phase which runs 2PC
over Raft consensus. Each of the two phases takes roughly
the same time, as shown in Figure 10b. The latency also
increases with the request rates.
Figure 10c shows the latency breakdown under the uni-
form read-only workload. The transaction lifecycle in TiDB
is the same as in the update-only workload, except that
the commit phase is replaced by a storage read operation.
In Fabric, the transaction finishes at the proposal phase,
without going through consensus and commit. We instru-
mented Fabric’s codebase to split the proposal phase into
three sub-phases: the authentication phase which authen-
ticates the client, the simulation phase which executes the
query against the local states, and the endorsement phase
which signs the results.
We observe that Fabric spends half of the time (575us) in
the simulation phase, another 374us and 128us for authen-
tication and endorsement respectively. The last two phases
are expensive because of the cryptographic computations.
In contrast, TiDB incurs no cryptographic overheads, and
most of its cost goes to the actual retrieval of data.
5.2.3 Effect of failure model
We compare the performance of Raft and Istanbul Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerant (IBFT) consensus in Quorum to illus-
trate the impact of different failure models. Recall that
Raft tolerates only crash failures, whereas IBFT can toler-
ate Byzantine failures. Figure 11 shows the peak throughput
where f denotes the number of tolerated failures.
We observe that the throughputs remain relatively con-
stant. This is because Quorum’s implementation underuti-
lizes Raft consensus, as explained in Section 5.1. IBFT’s
throughput does not degrade because it has not reached
its capacity at f = 6. However, we observe that IBFT’s
throughput exhibits higher variance in larger networks, as
evidenced by the greater error bar. This is due to the num-
ber of replicas needed in IBFT, which is 3f + 1, compared
to 2f + 1 replicas needed in Raft for a given value of f .
When f increases, the network becomes more unstable be-
cause of network delays, which leads to larger variances in
performance.
5.3 Concurrency
5.3.1 Effect of skewness
To demonstrate the effect of concurrency control mecha-
nisms, we use skewed workloads in which each transaction
modifies (first read, update and then write back) a single
record. The record’s key follows a Zipfian distribution with
the skewness coefficient θ. Figure 12a and 12b show the
throughputs and the corresponding abortion rates with in-
creasing θ. The most important observation here is that
blockchains and databases are comparable under a high con-
tention workload.
Since there is only one write operation per transaction,
more skewed workloads infer a larger amount of write-write
conflicts. Both serializability and snapshot isolation perform
poorly under write-write conflicts. This is demonstrated by
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Figure 12: Throughput and abortion rate with
skewed workloads. Each transaction modifies a sin-
gle record
the significant drop in throughput: CockroachDB from 1372
to 116 tps, and TiDB from 2151 to 286 when θ increases
from 0.8 to 1.0. Etcd and Quorum do not have concurrency
control because they execute transactions serially. Thus,
their performance is not affected by skewness.
Although Fabric commits transactions sequentially, we
observe a 31% drop in throughput from uniform to a skewed
workload with θ = 1. It is due to Fabric’s optimistic con-
currency control, in which a transaction contains versions
of the data accessed during the proposal phase, which are
then checked at the validation phase. If the versions are
not the latest, the transaction aborts. A skewed workload
means many transactions are writing the same records, as a
consequence increasing the probability of transaction abort.
Indeed, Figure 12b shows that nearly 44% of the transac-
tions abort when θ = 1.
Another interesting observation is that TiDB’s through-
put drop is disproportional to its increase in abort rate.
Specifically, when θ = 1, only 16% of TiDB’s transactions
fail but the throughput decreases by 80%. It is because, for
each transaction, a coordinator must obtain a latch on the
record. As a result, under highly skewed workload, the co-
ordinator spends more time contending for the record than
doing real work, therefore the throughput drops sharply.
5.3.2 Effect of operation count
Another way to increase contention is to include more
modification operations in each transaction. Figure 13a
shows the impact of the number of operations per trans-
action on the overall performance. To remove any effect of
transaction size, for a given number of operations we vary
the record size such that the total transaction size is 1KB.
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Figure 13: Throughput and abortion rate with uni-
formly modified records in a single transaction
For example, if a transaction writes to 10 records, then each
record contains 100 bytes.
We observe a similar trend for TiDB and CockroachDB, as
shown in Figure 12b. In particular, with 10 operations per
transaction, these systems achieve only 14% to 20% of the
throughput for single-operation transactions. Two sources
of overheads contribute to this drop in performance. First,
there are more conflicts when each transaction writes to
more records, which leads to a higher abortion rate. Sec-
ond, TiDB and CockroachDB use sharding, therefore a 10-
operation transaction may span multiple shards. As there
are more shards, the overhead of coordination (2PC) in-
creases. Etcd and Quorum are unaffected because they do
not have conflicts, and they do not support sharding.
Figure 13b shows the abortion rate of TiDB and Fabric
as the number of operations per transaction increases. Both
systems experience high abortion rates: 26.9% for TiDB
and 40% for Fabric. Interestingly, most aborts in Fabric
are caused by read operations, as opposed to by write op-
erations in TiDB. Specifically, during the proposal phase in
Fabric, a client must collect identical read results from the
peers. It is because we mandate each transaction proposal
must be simulated and endorsed by all peers. But differ-
ent results may be returned, as the peers have the disjoint
states, which is highly likely since they commit blocks at dif-
ferent rates. When a different result is received, the client
immediately aborts. Featured for its optimistic concurrency
control, TiDB, on the other hand, uses timestamps to check
if the updated data is still at the latest.
5.3.3 Effect of record size
Figure 14a and 14b show the system performance with
increasing record size under the uniform update workload.
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Figure 14: Performance under uniform update workload with increasing record size.
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All the databases exhibit a slight decrease in throughput
and an increase in latency. However, the two blockchains
behave differently. When the record grows from 10 to 5, 000
bytes, Fabric’s performance stays almost constant, but Quo-
rum suffers a significant drop of throughput, from 647 tps
to 48 tps, and a 6× increase in latency. To understand this,
we analyze the transaction latency breakdown in Fabric and
Quorum, the results of which are shown in Figure 14c. It
can be seen that Fabric transactions have longer latency,
and that in Quorum, the cost is dominated by the consen-
sus phase. The consensus latency in Quorum grows with the
record size because Raft protocol takes longer to broadcast
larger blocks. In contrast, the Kafka ordering service in Fab-
ric incurs less network communication than Raft, therefore
it is less sensitive block size.
Figure 14c shows that the commit time in Fabric is largely
constant, whereas in Quorum there is a significant jump
from 2ms for 10-byte records to 40ms for 5000-byte records.
By analyzing fine-grained timing logs, we find that in Fabric
the commit time accounts for less than 30% of the overall
latency, whereas in Quorum it accounts for 60% when the
record size is 5000 bytes. For each commit, Quorum’s virtual
machine (EVM) needs to reconstruct a newMPT tree, which
involves many expensive cryptographic hash computation.
We observe that the cost of a hash function increases with
the record size. In particular, we find that the cost of MPT
computation increases from 56us to 2.5ms when the record
size grows from 10 to 5000 bytes.
Another interesting observation from Figure 14c is that
the delay of the proposal phase in Quorum grows at the
same rate as the commit phase. This is due to Quorum’s
order-execute model, where transactions are firstly batched
and serially executed during the Proposal phase by the pro-
poser. After consensus, the batched transactions are serially
executed again by all the other nodes for validation and com-
mit. Hence, a transaction’s lifecycle in Quorum suffers from
the overhead of the sequential validation of in-block transac-
tions twice. Such double batching delay could severely de-
grade the performance when the smart contracts are compu-
tational heavy (, which takes more execution time). In con-
trast, Fabric adopts a simulate-order-commit model where
transactions are executed concurrently during the Proposal
phase, before being ordered and batched in the Consensus
phase. The serial processing only occurs once during the
Commit phase. However, concurrency comes at the cost of
potentially aborted in-block transactions that would break
the serializability, as we saw in the previous experiment.
5.4 Storage
5.4.1 Effect of record size on storage
Figure 15 shows the storage cost per record as we in-
crease the record size. For this experiment, we populated
the systems with 100k records. It can be seen that Fabric
incurs much higher storage overhead than TiDB. For a 5000-
byte record, the state storage consumes around 5000 bytes,
while the block storage consumes 15, 717 bytes. There is
no additional storage used by TiDB because no historical
information is maintained. And the associated metadata is
negligible. This result demonstrates that blockchains incur
significantly higher storage costs than databases because of
the underlying ledger abstraction.
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5.4.2 Security overhead for tamper evidence
To quantify the overhead incurred by the integrity pro-
tection mechanism in blockchains, we compare the perfor-
mance of Merkle Bucket Tree (MBT) from Hyperledger Fab-
ric v0.61 and Merkle Patricia Trie (MPT) from Quorum. We
inserted 10k records of different sizes and measured the state
storage cost per record.
Figure 16 shows that MBT adds a constant of 24 bytes per
record, while MPT adds over 1KB per record. Since both
MBT and MPT store the data records in the leaves, their dif-
ferences come from the tree structures: the deeper the tree,
the higher the storage overhead. The scale of MBT is fixed.
Specifically, MBT first hashes all records into 1,000 buckets,
on top of which a Merkle tree with a given fan-out is built.
Considering 1,000 buckets and a fan-out of 4 in our experi-
ments, the depth of the tree is capped at 5 (dlog41000e). As
a prefix tree, the depth of MPT is affected by the key length,
which is 16 bytes in our setting. Specifically, each internal
MPT node holds 4 bits of the key, hence, the depth and
fan-out can go up to 32 and 16, respectively. This explains
why MPT needs more space compared to MBT.
5.5 Sharding
To compare the impact of sharding on databases and
blockchains, we disable full replication in CockroachDB and
TiDB, and compare their performance with Attested Hyper-
ledger (AHL) [25], a state-of-the-art sharded blockchain. We
note that a comparison with Fabric or Quorum is not pos-
sible because these systems do not support sharding. AHL
leverages trusted hardware to reduce shard size and to im-
prove consensus throughput per shard. It supports cross-
shard transactions by running a BFT shard that implements
a 2PC state machine.
In our experiments, we set the number of replicas in the
databases and the shard size in the blockchain to 3. Fig-
ure 17 shows the throughputs for 8 nodes. It can be seen that
AHL’s throughput is lower than CockroachDB and TiDB,
for both YCSB and Smallbank workloads. The performance
gap is due to the high cost of PBFT compared to Raft, and
the cost of periodic shard reconfigurations.
6. RELATEDWORK
Comparison. Existing works that compare blockchains
and databases have highlighted their high-level differences.
[28] demonstrates a significant gap in performance, while [24,
34, 59, 20, 61] focus on the differences at the application
layer. Some of these studies propose empirical flow charts
to guide users in the quest of choosing solutions based on
blockchains or databases [59, 20, 61]. Our work presents a
deeper and more comprehensive comparison, by looking at
the fundamental designs of both systems. We consider them
as different types of transactional distributed systems. Our
taxonomy and quantitative, performance comparison illus-
trate both their similarities and their differences.
Performance benchmarking. There is a large number
of works that conduct separate benchmarking of distributed
databases [22, 14, 10] and blockchains [55, 16]. BLOCK-
BENCH [29] is the first to compare them side-by-side and
demonstrate that the performance of blockchain is still far
1Fabric v1.0 and later relax the security model and no longer
require tamper-evident indexes.
behind that of distributed databases. Our work is more
comprehensive than [29], as we consider systems that are
closely related to blockchains in their designs. We inves-
tigate the impact of more factors and interpret the results
with more fine-grained measurements. Our results demon-
strate a smaller performance gap between the two types of
systems than previously reported. And such a gap could be
smaller under specific workloads.
Bridging blockchains and databases. There is a trend
of integrating database designs into blockchains and vice
versa. In particular, some works apply well-established con-
currency control techniques to improve blockchain perfor-
mance [26, 53] or to reason about smart contracts’ behav-
ior [52]. [57, 51] use database techniques to enhance the
blockchain storage layer and expose richer information to
smart contracts. [48, 11, 30] propose hybrid designs that
support the relational data model and strong security. Our
work provides a novel framework for exploring the design
space of hybrid, database-blockchain systems. For instance,
we can design a hybrid system by starting with a database,
then selecting a different choice in one of the four design
dimensions discussed in Section 3.
There are recent proposals for solving the blockchain scal-
ability issues by partitioning states into multiple chains. For
examples, [35, 62, 36] extend database techniques for achiev-
ing atomicity to implement atomic transactions across the
chains. However, most have not been fully implemented or
tested.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a comprehensive comparison
between blockchains and distributed databases. We viewed
them as two different types of transactional distributed sys-
tems, and proposed a taxonomy consisting of four design
dimensions: replication, concurrency, storage, and shard-
ing. Using this taxonomy, we discussed how blockchains and
distributed databases make different design choices that are
driven by their high-level goals (security for blockchains, and
performance for databases).
We then performed a quantitative, performance compari-
son using five different systems covering a large area of the
design space. Our results illustrated the effects of different
design choices on the overall performance. Our compari-
son confirmed a large gap in performance between the two
classes of systems, but this gap is smaller than previously
reported. There are corner cases where the former may out-
perform the latter, especially when the workload is skewed
or the transaction entails more constraints. We also dis-
covered that the sequential in-ledger block validation could
limit the system throughput and negatively impact the la-
tency, as in the respective cases of Fabric and Quorum. Fi-
nally, our work provides a framework for exploring database-
blockchain hybrid designs. By providing deep insight into
the behavior of blockchains and distributed databases, our
paper opens new directions for future research.
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